The comparative negligence rule promoted as being both more just and more efficient than the traditional contributory negligence doctrine has come into dominance in American tort law. This paper questions one of the main efficiency-based arguments put forward in support of the rule -that, in the presence of judicial error, comparative negligence is generally superior. The analysis shows that this argument is invalid. This conclusion weakens the efficiency basis for current proposals to expand the reach of the comparative fault principle within tort law and beyond.
has allegedly prevailed, powerful remnants of contributory negligence often remain. 8 It appears that the inclination towards comparative fault rests on solid theoretical ground. But, does it? The comparative negligence rule has been promoted as being both more just and more efficient than the contributory negligence doctrine. 9 Leaving the undoubtedly important justice-based arguments for another day, the present analysis questions one of the main efficiency-based arguments put forward in support of the comparative negligence rule.
Economic analysis of tort law has demonstrated that in a world free from uncertainty several liability rules can lead to efficient care-taking by both the injurer and the victim. 10 Moreover, without uncertainty neither the injurer nor the victim would ever be found negligent by mistake. And, without a negligent victim (and a negligent injurer for that matter) the distinguishing features of the comparative negligence rule -as compared to the simple negligence rule or to 8 Approximately two-thirds of the states, which have allegedly adopted comparative fault, have actually rejected the pure comparative negligence rule, and opted for various forms of "modified" comparative negligence. In many of these jurisdictions the plaintiff is totally bared from recovery if found more than 50% at fault (for example, Michigan has enacted such a 50% rule in 1996 -Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.2959) -See Schwartz, supra note 1, Woods & Deere, supra note 1, and the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, § 17, comments a and b.
the negligence rule with a defense of contributory negligence -vanish.
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However, the real world, in which liability rules operate, is rarely (not to say never) free from uncertainty, and it has been argued that under conditions of uncertainty -where findings of negligence occur at equilibrium -comparative negligence emerges as the most efficient rule. This paper reexamines these procomparative negligence arguments.
Several studies have incorporated various forms of uncertainty into the traditional economic model of tort law. 12 In particular, uncertainty is generated, when liability rules are implemented by imperfectly informed courts.
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Two main types of judicial error have been identified. The first is evidentiary uncertainty, namely court errors in assessing a party's true level of care. In this assessment process, the court may hear testimony and admit evidence presented by the opposing parties. The inaccuracy of such a process is evident. The second type of judicial error concerns the determination of the levels of due care as part of the implementation of negligence-based liability rules. A legal rule based on judicial setting of optimal due care standards imposes a harsh informational burden on the courts. 14 In reality courts rarely possess the necessary information. 14 In order to derive the optimal due care standards the court must know the magnitude of the expected harm, the precaution opportunities of the parties (specifically how these precautions affect the probability and magnitude of the potential harm) and the costs of these precaution opportunities.
It has been shown that these distinct types of judicial error are analytically equivalent. 15 Hence, for clarity of exposition I shall generally focus on evidentiary uncertainty. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the efficiency argument for comparative negligence. This argument is shown to rely on three building blocks: (1) a specific ordering of the care levels induced by different liability rules (henceforth -"the ordering result"); (2) a claim that given the ordering result comparative negligence induces the most symmetric deviations from optimal care; and (3) an argument that symmetric incentives are efficient. Section III discusses the ordering result, and questions its robustness.
Section IV proves that symmetric deviations from the optimum are efficient only under certain assumptions. Section V shows that even if symmetric deviations are efficient, the comparative negligence rule does not generally induce the most 18 The comparative negligence rule may also be inferior to other liability rules in terms of administrative costs. The present study shows that even when administrative costs are insignificant comparative negligence is not generally the most efficient rule.
symmetric deviations, even when the ordering result holds. Section VI utilizes computer simulations to provide further support for the conclusion that comparative negligence is not the superior rule. Section VII concludes, sketching the implications of the analysis for current debates over the optimal reach of the comparative fault principle.
II. The Efficiency Argument for Comparative Negligence
The argument supporting the efficiency of the comparative negligence rule begins with the undisputed fact that evidentiary uncertainty causes deviations from optimal care. Let , under the contributory 35 In addition, symmetry implies that the two biases are in the same direction. Namely, either both biases are towards excessive care or both biases are towards inadequate care. 36 The important role of the assumption that precaution expenditures suffer from decreasing marginal productivity was first identified in Ben-Shahar, supra note 3. However, contrary to the assumptions, which are identified and analyzed in the text that follows this note, the assumption of decreasing marginal productivity is standard and seemingly less problematic in the present context. negligence rule. In short, the constant sum hypothesis asserts that the sum of the biases -in the injurer's care level and the victim's care level -is constant across the three liability rules.
Proponents of the comparative negligence rule have not attempted to defend the constant sum hypothesis, which actually seems quite unrealistic. 37 The central role of the constant sum hypothesis is illustrated by the following example:
Example 2: The optimal care levels remain as in example 1: In example 2, comparative negligence continues to induce the most symmetric biases. Nevertheless, it seems quite clear that the contributory negligence rule, and not the comparative negligence rule, is superior in this example.
The second implicit assumption, which is required for the efficiency of symmetric biases, and which was followed in both example 1 and example 2, is that both the injurer and the victim exercise excessive care under all three rules.
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This assumption is unrealistic, at least with respect to the victim's choice of care.
37 If the magnitude of the loss, which the liability rules divide between the parties, was unaffected by the pertaining rule, then the constant sum assumption may have been easier to defend. But the magnitude of the loss is clearly influenced by the liability rule. 38 This assumption is common in the literature. For example, Cooter & Ulen, supra note 9, argue that "[e]videntiary uncertainty … prompts rational decision makers to exceed the legal standard of care."
For example, under the simple negligence rule the victim will always choose inadequate care. To see this note that under the simple negligence rule, if the injurer is never found negligent, then the victim will bear any potential loss, and will thus exercise optimal care. But, given the possibility of judicial error, the injurer will be found negligent with a positive probability, and thus the victim no longer enjoys the full loss-reducing effect of his precaution investment. This dilutes the victim's incentives, and leads him to exercise less than optimal care.
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Moreover, it has been shown that for high levels of uncertainty, both the injurer and the victim may choose inadequate care at equilibrium, under all three liability rules.
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The problematic excessive care assumption is crucial for the efficiency of symmetric biases. The following example is illustrative:
Example 3: The optimal care levels remain as in example 1: 10
injurer's care levels under the three rules are:
, and the victim's care levels under the three rules are:
In example 3, comparative negligence continues to induce the most symmetric biases, and even the constant sum hypothesis is satisfied.
Nevertheless, the optimality of the comparative negligence rule is far from being 39 The result that the victim will always exercise inadequate care under the simple negligence rule, and may exercise inadequate care under the other two rules as well, is formally stated and proved in Bar-Gill, supra note 16. 40 This result was proved by Calfee & Craswell, supra note 15, in a unilateral care model (where only the injurer can exercise care) under the simple negligence rule, and was extended by Bar-Gill, supra note 16, to a bilateral care model, where both the injurer and clear. For instance, if deviations towards inadequate care are more detrimental, in terms of the overall social cost, compared to deviations towards excessive care, the simple negligence rule may well be the superior rule in example 3. Since the overall social cost function is generally asymmetric with respect to "positive" versus "negative" deviations from optimal care, symmetric biases are not necessarily efficient.
Both the constant sum hypothesis and the assumption that all deviations from the optimum are towards excessive care are crucial for the efficiency of symmetric biases. 41 I have also argued that these two assumptions are not generally satisfied. In the following section, I shall prove that even under these two strong assumptions, judicial error does not establish a case for comparative negligence.
the victim were shown to exercise inadequate care at equilibrium under all three liability rules. 41 In fact, it can be shown that under fairly weak conditions these two assumptions are sufficient for the efficiency of symmetric biases. -See Bar-Gill, supra note 16.
V. Does Comparative Negligence Induce the Most Symmetric Biases?
If all deviations are toward excessive care (i.e. the biases are all positive) and the constant sum hypothesis is valid, then the rule, which induces the most symmetric biases, is indeed the superior rule. 42 However, even if we accept the validity of these assumptions, and believe that symmetric biases are indeed optimal, there is still one more obstacle that we must pass before the comparative negligence rule can be declared the most efficient rule. We must show that comparative negligence indeed induces the most symmetric biases. And as it turns out the comparative negligence rule does not necessarily induce the most symmetric biases.
Traditional analysis implicitly assumes that the average deviation from optimal care on the injurer's side is equal to the average deviation on the victim's side. Under this assumption, comparative negligence indeed induces the most symmetric biases. Naturally, no argument was put forward in support of this implicit assumption, and there is no reason to believe that it is generally satisfied. 43 In fact, it can be argued that the average deviation on the injurer's side is systematically larger than the average deviation on the victim's side. All three negligence rules share an inherent asymmetry regarding the division of burden between the injurer and the victim. The injurer bears no liability under all three rules, unless she is found negligent. The victim, on the other hand, may bear the 42 See note 41, id. 43 When this assumption of equal average deviations is relaxed, neither comparative negligence nor any one of the two other rules generally induces the most symmetric biases. Bar-Gill, supra note 16, derives the conditions, under which each one of the three rules induces the most symmetric incentives.
harm even if he is not found negligent. This common asymmetry generates stronger incentives for the injurer to exercise excessive care under all three rules.
The three rules diverge only in the event that the injurer is found negligent, and only contingent on such a finding of negligence is the comparative negligence rule more symmetric. But, considering the common asymmetry pushing towards more excessive care by the injurer, the contributory negligence rule, which supplies the weakest incentives for the injurer to exercise excessive care conditional on a finding of negligence, may be the most symmetric rule overall.
The following example is illustrative. In example 4, the contributory negligence rule, and not the comparative negligence rule, induces the most symmetric incentives.
Symmetric incentives are not generally efficient. But, even when they are efficient, the comparative negligence rule does not generally induce the most symmetric incentives.
The above analysis has demonstrated that the comparative negligence rule is not generally superior to the other liability rules. Section VI utilizes computer simulations to illustrate this result. 44 The numeric analysis specifies the functional dependence of the expected loss, l, on the levels of care exercised by the injurer and the victim, x and y:
where the parameter h can be interpreted as representing the magnitude of the potential harm, and the parameter λ may represent the effectiveness of the parties' precautions in reducing the probability that harm will occur. The chosen family of expected loss functions follows the assumption of decreasing marginal productivity of precaution expenditures for both parties.
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Given this specification, the optimal levels of care are functions of the parameters h and λ , i.e.
Assuming that the court's errors are proportional to the level of care, let ω represent the level of uncertainty, where the standard deviation of the error term is ) ,
Starting with h = 10000 and 1 = λ , and assuming that court errors follow a Normal distribution 46 with no systematic bias (i.e. the mean of the error distribution is zero), I derive the relative social cost under the three liability rules,
for different values of ω . Figure 1 presents the results of the numeric analysis. 46 Qualitatively similar results obtain for a Uniform error distribution. As illustrated in figure 1 , the comparative negligence rule is optimal for low levels of uncertainty. 47 However, as the standard deviation of the court's error exceeds 30% of the optimal care level, the contributory negligence rule becomes optimal. Comparative negligence becomes optimal again when the standard deviation of the court's error exceeds 65% of the optimal care level.
Finally, the simple negligence rule is optimal for very high levels of uncertainty (in the present setting, whenever the standard deviation of the error exceeds 350% of the optimal care level).
These results are qualitatively robust to extreme variations in the levels of the parameters h and λ , subject to minor adjustments in the threshold levels of ω at which the efficiency ranking of the three rules changes. However, these threshold levels of ω are extremely sensitive to the functional form of l(x,y). The numeric analysis supports the previous conclusion that uncertainty does not establish a case for comparative negligence. All three rules may turn out to be optimal depending on the degree of uncertainty and on the functional form of the expected loss function. 47 When the standard deviation of the court's error falls below 10% of the optimal care level, the three rules generate very similar efficiency results, which are very close to the socially optimal level of care. For numeric reasons, it is difficult to calculate the precise equilibrium care levels for this range.
VII. Conclusion
Comparative negligence, and more broadly comparative fault, is spreading through tort law, and beyond. The rise of the comparative negligence rule has been supported by economic analysis, claiming that when courts are imperfectly informed this rule induces the most efficient outcome. The present study proves that this economic argument for comparative negligence does not generally hold. In fact, the traditional contributory negligence doctrine may well provide for lower overall costs when evidentiary uncertainty is accounted for.
While theoretical support for comparative negligence may come from other directions, uncertainty does not establish an economic case for comparative negligence.
While the analysis in this study has focused on the pure comparative negligence rule, as compared to the simple negligence rule and the contributory negligence rule, its implications are broader. First, with respect to the divide among the states over the optimal form of comparative negligence, the present analysis suggests that pure comparative negligence may not be the optimal rule.
In fact, various modified forms of comparative negligence, and in particular the rule with a (contributory negligence type) total bar to recovery for a plaintiff, who is more negligent than the defendant, 48 may prove to be the more efficient rules. Second, the present analysis urges careful consideration by courts and legislatures, before allowing the comparative fault principle to trump down remaining doctrines, which still provide for a complete bar to liability. Finally, 48 See supra note 8.
